Kolab Groupware OBS

apache2.dsc Changed

debian.changelog Changed

@@ -1,3 +1,79 @@
+apache2 (2.2.22-13.2+deb7u7) wheezy-security; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Merge patches from Debian 2.2.22-13+deb7u7.
+
+ -- Christoph Erhardt <kolab@sicherha.de>  Sun, 11 Sep 2016 20:50:48 +0200
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13+deb7u7) wheezy-security; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * CVE-2016-5387: Sets environmental variable based on user supplied Proxy
+    request header.
+    Don't pass through HTTP_PROXY in server/util_script.c
+
+ -- Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>  Wed, 20 Jul 2016 07:03:46 +0200
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13.2+deb7u6) wheezy-security; urgency=medium
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Merge patches from Debian 2.2.22-13+deb7u6.
+
+ -- Christoph Erhardt <kolab@sicherha.de>  Tue, 18 Aug 2015 17:15:25 +0200
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13+deb7u6) wheezy-security; urgency=medium
+
+  * Fix regression causing spurious errors when loading certificate chain.
+    Closes: #794383
+
+ -- Stefan Fritsch <sf@debian.org>  Tue, 18 Aug 2015 11:41:11 +0200
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13.2+deb7u5) wheezy-security; urgency=medium
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Merge patches from Debian 2.2.22-13+deb7u5.
+
+ -- Christoph Erhardt <kolab@sicherha.de>  Wed, 05 Aug 2015 10:10:27 +0200
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13+deb7u5) wheezy-security; urgency=medium
+
+  * CVE-2015-3183: Fix request smuggling via chunked transfer encoding.
+    Backported by Marc Deslauriers.
+  * Don't limit default DH parameters to 1024 bits. Closes: #780398
+    This may cause problems with some Java based clients. A work-around is to
+    configure these client not to use DHE key exchange but use ECDHE or RSA
+    instead.
+    A server-side work-around that limits the DH parameters to 1024 bits for
+    all clients is described at
+    http://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/ssl/ssl_faq.html#javadh .
+  * Backport support for adding DH parameters to the SSLCertificateFile.
+
+ -- Stefan Fritsch <sf@debian.org>  Sat, 01 Aug 2015 22:08:57 +0200
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13.2+deb7u4) wheezy; urgency=medium
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Merge patches from Debian 2.2.22-13+deb7u4.
+
+ -- Christoph Erhardt <kolab@sicherha.de>  Mon, 12 Jan 2015 13:59:06 +0100
+
+apache2 (2.2.22-13+deb7u4) wheezy; urgency=medium
+
+  * CVE-2013-5704: Fix handling of chunk trailers. A remote attacker could
+    use this flaw to bypass intended mod_headers restrictions, allowing
+    them to send requests to applications that include headers that should
+    have been removed by mod_headers.
+    The new behavior is to not merge trailers into the headers autmatically.
+    A new directive "MergeTrailers" is introduced to restore the old
+    behavior.
+  * Fix hostname comparison with SNI to be case insensitive. Closes: #771199
+  * Fix valule of SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_UID in mod_ssl (broken in 2.2.15).
+    Closes: #773841
+  * Add paragraph about session ticket key life-time and forward secrecy to
+    README.Debian. Closes: #762619
+
+ -- Stefan Fritsch <sf@debian.org>  Tue, 23 Dec 2014 23:44:24 +0100
+
 apache2 (2.2.22-13.2+deb7u3) wheezy-security; urgency=high
 
   * Non-maintainer upload.

debian.tar.gz/README.Debian Changed

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 		Enabling SSL
 		Creating self-signed certificates
 		SSL workaround for MSIE
+		ECC keys and ECDH ciphers
+		Session ticket key life-time and forward secrecy
+		DH parameters
 
 	Suexec
 	
@@ -246,6 +249,30 @@
 A special compatibility fix for older Safari browsers is enabled if using an
 up-to-date libssl-1.0.0 (version 1.0.1e-2+deb7u8 or newer).
 
+Session ticket key life-time and forward secrecy
+------------------------------------------------
+
+Apache uses TLS session tickets to improve handshake performance. By default, a
+new session key key is (re-)generated at startup and at every graceful restart.
+This means that an attacker that somehow gets access to the memory of the
+running apache process may decrypt past connections that have used the current
+session ticket key. This breaks forward secrecy even if the used cipher would
+have provided forward secrecy. There is currently no way to change Apache's
+behavior. If you want to mitigate this kind of attack, you should consider
+increasing the frequency of graceful restarts by changing the log rotation in
+/etc/logrotate.d/apache2 from weekly to daily.
+
+DH parameters
+-------------
+
+The package in Debian has support for Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters larger
+than 1024 bit and for custom DH parameters backported from Apache 2.2.30.
+This may cause connection failures with java clients that only support 1024
+bit DH parameters.  A work-around is to configure these client not to use DHE
+key exchange but use ECDHE or RSA instead.  A server-side work-around that
+limits the DH parameters to 1024 bits for all clients is described at
+http://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/ssl/ssl_faq.html#javadh
+
 
 Suexec
 ======

debian.tar.gz/patches/CVE-2013-5704_trailers.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+# http://svn,apache.org/r1619489
+#
+#  *) SECURITY: CVE-2013-5704 (cve.mitre.org)
+#     core: HTTP trailers could be used to replace HTTP headers
+#     late during request processing, potentially undoing or
+#     otherwise confusing modules that examined or modified
+#     request headers earlier.  Adds "MergeTrailers" directive to restore
+#     legacy behavior.  [Edward Lu, Yann Ylavic, Joe Orton, Eric Covener]
+#
+Index: apache2/modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c
+===================================================================
+--- apache2.orig/modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c
++++ apache2/modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c
+@@ -412,6 +412,12 @@
+     return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, apr_table_get(r->headers_in, a));
+ }
+ 
++static const char *log_trailer_in(request_rec *r, char *a)
++{
++    return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, apr_table_get(r->trailers_in, a));
++}
++
++
+ static APR_INLINE char *find_multiple_headers(apr_pool_t *pool,
+                                               const apr_table_t *table,
+                                               const char *key)
+@@ -495,6 +501,11 @@
+     return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, cp);
+ }
+ 
++static const char *log_trailer_out(request_rec *r, char *a)
++{
++    return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, apr_table_get(r->trailers_out, a));
++}
++
+ static const char *log_note(request_rec *r, char *a)
+ {
+     return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, apr_table_get(r->notes, a));
+@@ -813,7 +824,7 @@
+ static char *parse_log_item(apr_pool_t *p, log_format_item *it, const char **sa)
+ {
+     const char *s = *sa;
+-    ap_log_handler *handler;
++    ap_log_handler *handler = NULL;
+ 
+     if (*s != '%') {
+         return parse_log_misc_string(p, it, sa);
+@@ -883,7 +894,16 @@
+             break;
+ 
+         default:
+-            handler = (ap_log_handler *)apr_hash_get(log_hash, s++, 1);
++            /* check for '^' + two character format first */
++            if (*s == '^' && *(s+1) && *(s+2)) { 
++                handler = (ap_log_handler *)apr_hash_get(log_hash, s, 3); 
++                if (handler) { 
++                   s += 3;
++                }
++            }
++            if (!handler) {  
++                handler = (ap_log_handler *)apr_hash_get(log_hash, s++, 1);  
++            }
+             if (!handler) {
+                 char dummy[2];
+ 
+@@ -1389,7 +1409,7 @@
+     log_struct->func = handler;
+     log_struct->want_orig_default = def;
+ 
+-    apr_hash_set(log_hash, tag, 1, (const void *)log_struct);
++    apr_hash_set(log_hash, tag, strlen(tag), (const void *)log_struct);
+ }
+ static ap_log_writer_init* ap_log_set_writer_init(ap_log_writer_init *handle)
+ {
+@@ -1558,6 +1578,9 @@
+         log_pfn_register(p, "U", log_request_uri, 1);
+         log_pfn_register(p, "s", log_status, 1);
+         log_pfn_register(p, "R", log_handler, 1);
++
++        log_pfn_register(p, "^ti", log_trailer_in, 0);
++        log_pfn_register(p, "^to", log_trailer_out, 0);
+     }
+ 
+     /* reset to default conditions */
+Index: apache2/modules/http/http_request.c
+===================================================================
+--- apache2.orig/modules/http/http_request.c
++++ apache2/modules/http/http_request.c
+@@ -384,8 +384,10 @@
+     new->main            = r->main;
+ 
+     new->headers_in      = r->headers_in;
++    new->trailers_in     = r->trailers_in;
+     new->headers_out     = apr_table_make(r->pool, 12);
+     new->err_headers_out = r->err_headers_out;
++    new->trailers_out    = apr_table_make(r->pool, 5);
+     new->subprocess_env  = rename_original_env(r->pool, r->subprocess_env);
+     new->notes           = apr_table_make(r->pool, 5);
+ 
+@@ -495,6 +497,8 @@
+                                        r->headers_out);
+     r->err_headers_out = apr_table_overlay(r->pool, rr->err_headers_out,
+                                            r->err_headers_out);
++    r->trailers_out = apr_table_overlay(r->pool, rr->trailers_out,
++                                           r->trailers_out);
+     r->subprocess_env = apr_table_overlay(r->pool, rr->subprocess_env,
+                                           r->subprocess_env);
+ 
+Index: apache2/modules/http/http_filters.c
+===================================================================
+--- apache2.orig/modules/http/http_filters.c
++++ apache2/modules/http/http_filters.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,49 @@
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static apr_status_t read_chunked_trailers(http_ctx_t *ctx, ap_filter_t *f,
++                                          apr_bucket_brigade *b, int merge)
++{
++    int rv;
++    apr_bucket *e;
++    request_rec *r = f->r;
++    apr_table_t *saved_headers_in = r->headers_in;
++    int saved_status = r->status;
++
++    r->status = HTTP_OK;
++    r->headers_in = r->trailers_in;
++    apr_table_clear(r->headers_in);
++    ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
++    ap_get_mime_headers(r);
++
++    if(r->status == HTTP_OK) {
++        r->status = saved_status;
++        e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
++        APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
++        ctx->eos_sent = 1;
++        rv = APR_SUCCESS;
++    }
++    else {
++        const char *error_notes = apr_table_get(r->notes,
++                                                "error-notes");
++        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, 
++                      "Error while reading HTTP trailer: %i%s%s",
++                      r->status, error_notes ? ": " : "",
++                      error_notes ? error_notes : "");
++        rv = APR_EINVAL;
++    }
++
++    if(!merge) {
++        r->headers_in = saved_headers_in;
++    }
++    else {
++        r->headers_in = apr_table_overlay(r->pool, saved_headers_in,
++                r->trailers_in);
++    }
++
++    return rv;
++}
++
+ /* This is the HTTP_INPUT filter for HTTP requests and responses from
+  * proxied servers (mod_proxy).  It handles chunked and content-length
+  * bodies.  This can only be inserted/used after the headers
+@@ -215,6 +258,7 @@
+                             ap_input_mode_t mode, apr_read_type_e block,
+                             apr_off_t readbytes)
+ {
++    core_server_config *conf;
+     apr_bucket *e;
+     http_ctx_t *ctx = f->ctx;
+     apr_status_t rv;
+@@ -222,6 +266,9 @@
+     int http_error = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
+     apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
+ 
++    conf = (core_server_config *)
++        ap_get_module_config(f->r->server->module_config, &core_module);
++
+     /* just get out of the way of things we don't want. */
+     if (mode != AP_MODE_READBYTES && mode != AP_MODE_GETLINE) {
+         return ap_get_brigade(f->next, b, mode, block, readbytes);
+@@ -395,13 +442,8 @@
+             }
+ 
+             if (!ctx->remaining) {
+-                /* Handle trailers by calling ap_get_mime_headers again! */
+-                ctx->state = BODY_NONE;
+-                ap_get_mime_headers(f->r);
+-                e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
+-                APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(b, e);
+-                ctx->eos_sent = 1;
+-                return APR_SUCCESS;
++                return read_chunked_trailers(ctx, f, b,
++                        conf->merge_trailers == AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_ENABLE);
+             }
+         }
+     }
+@@ -501,13 +543,8 @@
+                 }
+

debian.tar.gz/patches/CVE-2015-3183.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,801 @@
+Description: fix request smuggling via chunked transfer encoding
+Origin: backport, http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1687338
+Origin: backport, http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1687339
+Origin: backport, http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1688936
+Origin: backport, http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1689522
+
+Index: apache2-2.2.22/modules/http/http_filters.c
+===================================================================
+--- apache2-2.2.22.orig/modules/http/http_filters.c	2015-07-24 09:33:00.000000000 -0400
++++ apache2-2.2.22/modules/http/http_filters.c	2015-07-24 13:06:08.276786883 -0400
+@@ -56,27 +56,33 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+-#define INVALID_CHAR -2
+-
+-static long get_chunk_size(char *);
+-
+-typedef struct http_filter_ctx {
++typedef struct http_filter_ctx
++{
+     apr_off_t remaining;
+     apr_off_t limit;
+     apr_off_t limit_used;
+-    enum {
+-        BODY_NONE,
+-        BODY_LENGTH,
+-        BODY_CHUNK,
+-        BODY_CHUNK_PART
++    apr_int32_t chunk_used;
++    apr_int32_t chunk_bws;
++    apr_int32_t chunkbits;
++    enum
++    {
++        BODY_NONE, /* streamed data */
++        BODY_LENGTH, /* data constrained by content length */
++        BODY_CHUNK, /* chunk expected */
++        BODY_CHUNK_PART, /* chunk digits */
++        BODY_CHUNK_EXT, /* chunk extension */
++        BODY_CHUNK_CR, /* got space(s) after digits, expect [CR]LF or ext */
++        BODY_CHUNK_LF, /* got CR after digits or ext, expect LF */
++        BODY_CHUNK_DATA, /* data constrained by chunked encoding */
++        BODY_CHUNK_END, /* chunked data terminating CRLF */
++        BODY_CHUNK_END_LF, /* got CR after data, expect LF */
++        BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER /* trailers */
+     } state;
+-    int eos_sent;
+-    char chunk_ln[32];
+-    char *pos;
+-    apr_off_t linesize;
++    unsigned int eos_sent :1;
+     apr_bucket_brigade *bb;
+ } http_ctx_t;
+ 
++/* bail out if some error in the HTTP input filter happens */
+ static apr_status_t bail_out_on_error(http_ctx_t *ctx,
+                                       ap_filter_t *f,
+                                       int http_error)
+@@ -92,119 +98,162 @@
+     e = apr_bucket_eos_create(f->c->bucket_alloc);
+     APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, e);
+     ctx->eos_sent = 1;
++    /* If chunked encoding / content-length are corrupt, we may treat parts
++     * of this request's body as the next one's headers.
++     * To be safe, disable keep-alive.
++     */
++    f->r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
+     return ap_pass_brigade(f->r->output_filters, bb);
+ }
+ 
+-static apr_status_t get_remaining_chunk_line(http_ctx_t *ctx,
+-                                             apr_bucket_brigade *b,
+-                                             int linelimit)
++/**
++ * Parse a chunk line with optional extension, detect overflow.
++ * There are two error cases:
++ *  1) If the conversion would require too many bits, APR_EGENERAL is returned.
++ *  2) If the conversion used the correct number of bits, but an overflow
++ *     caused only the sign bit to flip, then APR_ENOSPC is returned.
++ * In general, any negative number can be considered an overflow error.
++ */
++static apr_status_t parse_chunk_size(http_ctx_t *ctx, const char *buffer,
++                                     apr_size_t len, int linelimit)
+ {
+-    apr_status_t rv;
+-    apr_off_t brigade_length;
+-    apr_bucket *e;
+-    const char *lineend;
+-    apr_size_t len;
++    apr_size_t i = 0;
+ 
+-    /*
+-     * As the brigade b should have been requested in mode AP_MODE_GETLINE
+-     * all buckets in this brigade are already some type of memory
+-     * buckets (due to the needed scanning for LF in mode AP_MODE_GETLINE)
+-     * or META buckets.
+-     */
+-    rv = apr_brigade_length(b, 0, &brigade_length);
+-    if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
+-        return rv;
+-    }
+-    /* Sanity check. Should never happen. See above. */
+-    if (brigade_length == -1) {
+-        return APR_EGENERAL;
+-    }
+-    if (!brigade_length) {
+-        return APR_EAGAIN;
+-    }
+-    ctx->linesize += brigade_length;
+-    if (ctx->linesize > linelimit) {
+-        return APR_ENOSPC;
+-    }
+-    /*
+-     * As all buckets are already some type of memory buckets or META buckets
+-     * (see above), we only need to check the last byte in the last data bucket.
+-     */
+-    for (e = APR_BRIGADE_LAST(b);
+-         e != APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(b);
+-         e = APR_BUCKET_PREV(e)) {
++    while (i < len) {
++        char c = buffer[i];
++
++        ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(&c, 1);
+ 
+-        if (APR_BUCKET_IS_METADATA(e)) {
++        /* handle CRLF after the chunk */
++        if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END
++                || ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END_LF) {
++            if (c == LF) {
++                ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK;
++            }
++            else if (c == CR && ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_END) {
++                ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_END_LF;
++            }
++            else {
++                /*
++                 * LF expected.
++                 */
++                return APR_EINVAL;
++            }
++            i++;
+             continue;
+         }
+-        rv = apr_bucket_read(e, &lineend, &len, APR_BLOCK_READ);
+-        if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
+-            return rv;
++
++        /* handle start of the chunk */
++        if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK) {
++            if (!apr_isxdigit(c)) {
++                /*
++                 * Detect invalid character at beginning. This also works for
++                 * empty chunk size lines.
++                 */
++                return APR_EINVAL;
++            }
++            else {
++                ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_PART;
++            }
++            ctx->remaining = 0;
++            ctx->chunkbits = sizeof(apr_off_t) * 8;
++            ctx->chunk_used = 0;
++            ctx->chunk_bws = 0;
+         }
+-        if (len > 0) {
+-            break;  /* we got the data we want */
++
++        if (c == LF) {
++            if (ctx->remaining) {
++                ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_DATA;
++            }
++            else {
++                ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_TRAILER;
++            }
+         }
+-        /* If we got a zero-length data bucket, we try the next one */
+-    }
+-    /* We had no data in this brigade */
+-    if (!len || e == APR_BRIGADE_SENTINEL(b)) {
+-        return APR_EAGAIN;
+-    }
+-    if (lineend[len - 1] != APR_ASCII_LF) {
+-        return APR_EAGAIN;
+-    }
+-    /* Line is complete. So reset ctx->linesize for next round. */
+-    ctx->linesize = 0;
+-    return APR_SUCCESS;
+-}
++        else if (ctx->state == BODY_CHUNK_LF) {
++            /*
++             * LF expected.
++             */
++            return APR_EINVAL;
++        }
++        else if (c == CR) {
++            ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_LF;
++        }
++        else if (c == ';') {
++            ctx->state = BODY_CHUNK_EXT;

debian.tar.gz/patches/CVE-2016-5387.patch Added

debian.tar.gz/patches/DH-SSLCertificateFile.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,1373 @@
+# DP: backport support for adding DH parameters to the SSLCertificateFile
+
+--- a/docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.html.en
++++ b/docs/manual/mod/mod_ssl.html.en
+@@ -388,12 +388,47 @@ SSLCertificateChainFile /usr/local/apach
+ <tr><th><a href="directive-dict.html#Module">Module:</a></th><td>mod_ssl</td></tr>
+ </table>
+ <p>
+-This directive points to the PEM-encoded Certificate file for the server and
+-optionally also to the corresponding RSA or DSA Private Key file for it
+-(contained in the same file). If the contained Private Key is encrypted the
+-Pass Phrase dialog is forced at startup time. This directive can be used up to
+-two times (referencing different filenames) when both a RSA and a DSA based
+-server certificate is used in parallel.</p>
++This directive points to a file with certificate data in PEM format.
++At a minimum, the file must include an end-entity (leaf) certificate.
++The directive can be used up to three times (referencing different filenames)
++when an RSA, a DSA, and an ECC based server certificate is used in parallel.
++</p>
++
++<p>
++Custom DH parameters and an EC curve name for ephemeral keys,
++can be added to end of the first file configured using
++<code class="directive"><a href="#sslcertificatefile">SSLCertificateFile</a></code>.
++Such parameters can be generated using the commands
++<code>openssl dhparam</code> and <code>openssl ecparam</code>.
++The parameters can be added as-is to the end of the first
++certificate file. Only the first file can be used for custom
++parameters, as they are applied independently of the authentication
++algorithm type.
++</p>
++
++<p>
++Finally the the end-entity certificate's private key can also be
++added to the certificate file instead of using a separate
++<code class="directive"><a href="#sslcertificatekeyfile">SSLCertificateKeyFile</a></code>
++directive. This practice is highly discouraged. If the private
++key is encrypted, the pass phrase dialog is forced at startup time.
++</p>
++
++<div class="note">
++<h3>DH parameter interoperability with primes &gt; 1024 bit</h3>
++<p>
++Beginning with version 2.2.30, mod_ssl makes use of
++standardized DH parameters with prime lengths of 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144 and
++8192 bits (from <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3526.txt">RFC 3526</a>),
++and hands them out to clients based on the length of the certificate's RSA/DSA
++key.
++With Java-based clients in particular (Java 7 or earlier), this may lead
++to handshake failures - see this
++<a href="../ssl/ssl_faq.html#javadh">FAQ answer</a> for working around
++such issues.
++</p>
++</div>
++
+ <div class="example"><h3>Example</h3><p><code>
+ SSLCertificateFile /usr/local/apache2/conf/ssl.crt/server.crt
+ </code></p></div>
+@@ -409,18 +444,22 @@ SSLCertificateFile /usr/local/apache2/co
+ <tr><th><a href="directive-dict.html#Module">Module:</a></th><td>mod_ssl</td></tr>
+ </table>
+ <p>
+-This directive points to the PEM-encoded Private Key file for the
+-server. If the Private Key is not combined with the Certificate in the
+-<code class="directive">SSLCertificateFile</code>, use this additional directive to
+-point to the file with the stand-alone Private Key. When
+-<code class="directive">SSLCertificateFile</code> is used and the file
+-contains both the Certificate and the Private Key this directive need
+-not be used. But we strongly discourage this practice.  Instead we
+-recommend you to separate the Certificate and the Private Key. If the
+-contained Private Key is encrypted, the Pass Phrase dialog is forced
+-at startup time. This directive can be used up to two times
+-(referencing different filenames) when both a RSA and a DSA based
+-private key is used in parallel.</p>
++This directive points to the PEM-encoded private key file for the
++server. If the contained private key is encrypted, the pass phrase
++dialog is forced at startup time.</p>
++
++<p>
++The directive can be used up to three times (referencing different filenames)
++when an RSA, a DSA, and an ECC based private key is used in parallel. For each
++<code class="directive"><a href="#sslcertificatekeyfile">SSLCertificateKeyFile</a></code>
++directive, there must be a matching <code class="directive">SSLCertificateFile</code>
++directive.</p>
++
++<p>
++The private key may also be combined with the certificate in the file given by
++<code class="directive"><a href="#sslcertificatefile">SSLCertificateFile</a></code>, but this practice
++is highly discouraged.</p>
++
+ <div class="example"><h3>Example</h3><p><code>
+ SSLCertificateKeyFile /usr/local/apache2/conf/ssl.key/server.key
+ </code></p></div>
+@@ -1886,6 +1925,6 @@ SSLVerifyDepth 10
+ <div class="bottomlang">
+ <p><span>Available Languages: </span><a href="../en/mod/mod_ssl.html" title="English">&nbsp;en&nbsp;</a></p>
+ </div><div id="footer">
+-<p class="apache">Copyright 2012 The Apache Software Foundation.<br />Licensed under the <a href="http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0">Apache License, Version 2.0</a>.</p>
++<p class="apache">Copyright 2015 The Apache Software Foundation.<br />Licensed under the <a href="http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0">Apache License, Version 2.0</a>.</p>
+ <p class="menu"><a href="../mod/">Modules</a> | <a href="../mod/directives.html">Directives</a> | <a href="../faq/">FAQ</a> | <a href="../glossary.html">Glossary</a> | <a href="../sitemap.html">Sitemap</a></p></div>
+ </body></html>
+\ No newline at end of file
+--- a/docs/manual/ssl/ssl_faq.html.en
++++ b/docs/manual/ssl/ssl_faq.html.en
+@@ -675,6 +675,7 @@ HTTPS to an Apache+mod_ssl server with M
+ <li><a href="#nn">Why do I get I/O errors, or the message "Netscape has 
+ encountered bad data from the server", when connecting via
+ HTTPS to an Apache+mod_ssl server with Netscape Navigator?</a></li>
++<li><a href="#javadh">Why do I get handshake failures with Java-based clients when using a certificate with more than 1024 bits?</a></li>
+ </ul>
+ 
+ <h3><a name="random" id="random">Why do I get lots of random SSL protocol 
+@@ -907,6 +908,40 @@ HTTPS to an Apache+mod_ssl server with N
+     implementation is correct, so when you encounter I/O errors with Netscape
+     Navigator it is usually caused by the configured certificates.</p>
+ 
++
++<h3><a name="javadh" id="javadh">Why do I get handshake failures with Java-based clients when using a certificate with more than 1024 bits?</a></h3>
++    <p>Beginning with version 2.2.30,
++    <code class="module"><a href="../mod/mod_ssl.html">mod_ssl</a></code> will use DH parameters which include primes
++    with lengths of more than 1024 bits. Java 7 and earlier limit their
++    support for DH prime sizes to a maximum of 1024 bits, however.</p>
++
++    <p>If your Java-based client aborts with exceptions such as
++    <code>java.lang.RuntimeException: Could not generate DH keypair</code> and
++    <code>java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException: Prime size must be
++    multiple of 64, and can only range from 512 to 1024 (inclusive)</code>,
++    and httpd logs <code>tlsv1 alert internal error (SSL alert number 80)</code>
++    (at <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/core.html#loglevel">LogLevel</a></code> <code>info</code>
++    or higher), you can either rearrange mod_ssl's cipher list with
++    <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_ssl.html#sslciphersuite">SSLCipherSuite</a></code>
++    (possibly in conjunction with <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_ssl.html#sslhonorcipherorder">SSLHonorCipherOrder</a></code>),
++    or you can use custom DH parameters with a 1024-bit prime, which
++    will always have precedence over any of the built-in DH parameters.</p>
++
++    <p>To generate custom DH parameters, use the <code>openssl dhparam 1024</code>
++    command. Alternatively, you can use the following standard 1024-bit DH
++    parameters from <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt">RFC 2409</a>,
++    section 6.2:</p>
++    <div class="example"><pre>-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
++MIGHAoGBAP//////////yQ/aoiFowjTExmKLgNwc0SkCTgiKZ8x0Agu+pjsTmyJR
++Sgh5jjQE3e+VGbPNOkMbMCsKbfJfFDdP4TVtbVHCReSFtXZiXn7G9ExC6aY37WsL
++/1y29Aa37e44a/taiZ+lrp8kEXxLH+ZJKGZR7OZTgf//////////AgEC
++-----END DH PARAMETERS-----</pre></div>
++    <p>Add the custom parameters including the "BEGIN DH PARAMETERS" and
++    "END DH PARAMETERS" lines to the end of the first certificate file
++    you have configured using the
++    <code class="directive"><a href="../mod/mod_ssl.html#sslcertificatefile">SSLCertificateFile</a></code> directive.</p>
++
++
+ </div><div class="top"><a href="#page-header"><img alt="top" src="../images/up.gif" /></a></div>
+ <div class="section">
+ <h2><a name="support" id="support">mod_ssl Support</a></h2>
+@@ -1054,6 +1089,6 @@ the reason for my core dump?</a></h3>
+ <div class="bottomlang">
+ <p><span>Available Languages: </span><a href="../en/ssl/ssl_faq.html" title="English">&nbsp;en&nbsp;</a></p>
+ </div><div id="footer">
+-<p class="apache">Copyright 2012 The Apache Software Foundation.<br />Licensed under the <a href="http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0">Apache License, Version 2.0</a>.</p>
++<p class="apache">Copyright 2015 The Apache Software Foundation.<br />Licensed under the <a href="http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0">Apache License, Version 2.0</a>.</p>
+ <p class="menu"><a href="../mod/">Modules</a> | <a href="../mod/directives.html">Directives</a> | <a href="../faq/">FAQ</a> | <a href="../glossary.html">Glossary</a> | <a href="../sitemap.html">Sitemap</a></p></div>
+ </body></html>
+\ No newline at end of file
+--- a/modules/ssl/mod_ssl.c
++++ b/modules/ssl/mod_ssl.c
+@@ -422,15 +422,6 @@ int ssl_init_ssl_connection(conn_rec *c)
+ 
+     sslconn->ssl = ssl;
+ 
+-    /*
+-     *  Configure callbacks for SSL connection
+-     */
+-    SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ssl, ssl_callback_TmpRSA);
+-    SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(ssl,  ssl_callback_TmpDH);
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+-    SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(ssl, ssl_callback_TmpECDH);
+-#endif
+-
+     SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK);
+ 
+     ssl_io_filter_init(c, ssl);
+--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_config.c
++++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_config.c
+@@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ SSLModConfigRec *ssl_config_global_creat
+     mc->szCryptoDevice         = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    memset(mc->pTmpKeys, 0, sizeof(mc->pTmpKeys));
+-
+     apr_pool_userdata_set(mc, SSL_MOD_CONFIG_KEY,
+                           apr_pool_cleanup_null,
+                           pool);
+--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_dh.c
++++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_dh.c
+@@ -41,21 +41,9 @@
+ **         0e:3e:30:06:80:a3:03:0c:6e:4c:37:57:d0:8f:70:
+ **         e6:aa:87:10:33
+ **     generator: 2 (0x2)
+-** Diffie-Hellman-Parameters: (1024 bit)
+-**     prime:

debian.tar.gz/patches/SNI_case_insensitve.diff Added

debian.tar.gz/patches/SSL_CTX_use_certificate_clear_errors.diff Added

debian.tar.gz/patches/mod_ssl_SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_UID.diff Added

debian.tar.gz/patches/series Changed

Difference Between Revision 5 and Kolab:3.4 / httpd